國立中正大學哲學系教學大綱（碩、博合開）

114 學年度第 2 學期

課程名稱(中文)	倫理自然主義		
課程名稱(英文)	Ethical Naturalism		
授　課　教　師	吳秀瑾	修　別	□必修　□必選　■專選
課　　碼		學分數	3
課　程　概　述	本課程以 David Copp（2025）對倫理自然主義與規範性問題的系統性辯護為核心，深入探討近年間後設倫理學中關於規範性（normativity）、理由（reasons）、演化去蔽論證（EDA）與方法論自然化的正反辯論。課程最後以 Philippa Foot 與 Mary Midgley 的「厚自然主義」作為替代與批判性總結。		
學　習　目　標	1. 精準重構當代倫理自然主義的主要論證。 2. 理解規範性問題在後設倫理中的不同層次。 3. 能以厚自然主義回應當代去蔽論證與規範性挑戰		
課　程 進　度	Week 1 02/25 課程簡介 Week 2 03/04 **規範性問題** Copp (2025) Introduction Scanlon (1998) *What We Owe to Each Other*, pp.17–36 Week 3 03/11 自然主義的挑戰：Open Question Copp (2025), ch.1 Moore (1903) *Principia Ethica*, §10–13 Mackie (1977), *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*, ch.1 §1–5. Week 4 03/18 規範性與理由 Copp (2025), ch.2 Parfit, D. *Normativity* (Tanner Lecture), pp.1–18 Week 5 03/25 事假（訂於第十六週期末考週補課） Week 6 04/01 倫理自然主義的形上學基礎 Copp (2025), ch.3 Railton (1986), “Moral Realism,” *Philosophical Review*, pp.171–189. Week 7 04/08　春假 Week 8 04/15 功能、自然事實與規範性 Copp (2025), ch.4 Millikan (1989), “In Defense of Proper Functions”		

	Week 9 04/22 演化挑戰：Darwinian Debunking Arguments Copp (2025), ch.5 Street (2006) “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value,” pp.121–142 Week 10 04/29 回應 Street：規範治理與合理性 Copp (2025), ch.6 Street (2011) “Mind-Independence without the Mystery,” §1–3 Week 11 05/06 社會規範、權威與自然化方法 Copp (2025), ch.7 Hanson (2019) pp.1–12 Week 12 05/13 規範性形上學 vs 語義學 Copp (2025), ch.8 Enoch (2007), “An Outline of an Argument for Robust Realism” Week 13 05/20 實踐權威與規範性理由 Copp (2025), ch.9 (part 1) Raz (2006), “The Myth of Instrumental Rationality” Week 14 05/27 反自然主義的當代挑戰（EDA 再挑戰） Copp (2025), ch.9 (Part 2) Kahane (2011), “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments,” *Noûs* Week 15 06/03 倫理自然主義的整體辯護 Copp (2025), ch.10 (part 1) Finlay (2008), “Defendig Normative Naturalism” Week 16 06/16（期末考週） 轉向厚自然主義：生命形式與自然善 Copp (2025), ch.10 (part 2) Foot (2001), chapter 1 Midgley (2001), *Science and Poetry*, ch.6 Week 17 自主學習週 Week 18 自主學習週
教 科 書 及 參 考 書 目	**指定教材** Copp, D. (2025). *Ethical naturalism and the problem of normativity*. Oxford University Press. Enoch, D. (2007). An outline of an argument for robust realism. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), *Oxford studies in metaethics*(Vol. 2, pp. 21–50). Oxford University Press. Finlay, S. (2008). Defending normative naturalism. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), *Oxford studies in metaethics* (Vol. 3, pp. 1–31). Oxford University Press. Foot, P. (2001). *Natural goodness*. Oxford University Press. Hanson, R. (2019). Social norms and naturalized ethics. Kahane, G. (2011). Evolutionary debunking arguments. *Noûs*, 45(1), 103–125.

	Mackie, J. L. (1977). *Ethics: Inventing right and wrong*. Penguin. Midgley, M. (2001). *Science and poetry*. Routledge. Millikan, R. G. (1989). In defense of proper functions. *Philosophy of Science*, 56(2), 288–302. Moore, G. E. (1903). *Principia ethica*. Cambridge University Press. Parfit, D. (2011). Normativity. In G. Peterson (Ed.), *The Tanner lectures on human values*. University of Utah Press. Railton, P. (1986). Moral realism. *The Philosophical Review*, 95(2), 163–207. Raz, J. (2006). The myth of instrumental rationality. *Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy*, 1(1), 1–28. Scanlon, T. M. (1998). *What we owe to each other*. Harvard University Press. Street, S. (2006). A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value. *Philosophical Studies*, 127(1), 109–166. Street, S. (2011). Mind-independence without the mystery: Why quasi-realists can't have it both ways. *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, 6, 1–32.
成績評量方式	碩士生 課堂參與 30% 課堂報告 30% (兩次，每次 15%)) 期末研究論文 40%
課程核心能力 （可複選）	■1. 具備哲學基本知識，以及理解哲學基本問題、概念與重要學說。 ■ 2. 具備邏輯推理、概念分析、反思批判、另類思維、閱讀哲學經典與清楚表達複雜觀念之能力，避免獨斷或謬誤。 ■ 3. 認識哲學之功能與價值。 ■ 4. 具有文化素養與關懷，對於哲學如何改變人類及影響歷史發展，有初步的認識。
備註	選修課程請勾選隸屬領域：■經典哲學家與哲學史□形上學□知識論■倫理學與法政哲學□心靈與語言哲學□科學史與科學哲學□數理邏輯與哲學邏輯