

課程名稱(中文)	理由論		
課程名稱(英文)	Reasons		
授課教師	王一奇	修別	<input type="checkbox"/> 必修 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 選修
課 碼	1257502	學分數	3
課程概述	<p>本課程關心的議題為理由、行動、以及兩者間的關連。在課程中，我們將針對以下議題的相關文獻進行討論，包含「規範理由」、「理由與決策」、「理由與理性」、「依理由而行動」等議題。學生們被預期將閱讀課堂相關指定文獻，以及針對最新相關議題研究文獻進行報告，並繳交期末報告。</p>		
學習目標	<p>在課程中，學生將能透過對於相關文獻的閱讀及討論，對於理由與行動的相關議題中，幾個重要的爭論有基本的掌握。課程中將涵蓋的重要爭論，包含內在理由與外在理由的爭論，理由是否為解釋的爭論、理由是否為推理前題的爭論、以及理由是否為證據的爭論、規範的「應該」的歧意性爭論、理由是否需要為知識的爭論、理性形式為何的爭議、以及如何依理由而行動的爭議。</p>		
課程進度	<p>課程進度及閱讀文獻：文獻詳細資料見附錄</p> <p>Week 1 (02/24): Logins (2022), Ch 1  Week 2 (03/03): Logins (2022), Ch 2  Week 3 (03/10): Logins (2022), Ch 3  Week 4 (03/17): Logins (2022), Ch 4  Week 5 (03/23): Logins (2022), Ch 5  Week 6 (03/30): Williams (1979), Millgram (1996)  Week 7 (04/07): No Class  Week 8 (04/14): Korsgaard (1986), Schroeder (2008)  Week 9 (04/21): Broome (2004), Brunero (2013)  Week 10 (04/28): Way (2017), McHugh &amp; Way (2018)  Week 11 (05/05): Hawthorne &amp; Stanley (2008), Neta (2009)  Week 12 (05/12): 王一奇 (2015), Wang &amp; Wang (2015)  Week 13 (05/19): Student Presentation  Week 14 (05/26): Student Presentation  Week 15 (06/02): Student Presentation  Week 16 (06/09): Student Presentation  (06/23) 期末報告繳交期限</p>		

教科書及 參考書目	<p>閱讀文獻詳見附錄</p> <p style="color: red;">(請尊重智慧財產權，不得非法影印教師指定之教科書籍)</p>
成績評量方式	<p>請分別註明碩士班及博士班成績評量方式 碩博班成績評量方式如下：</p> <p>課堂報告：40% (學生需選擇 2020 年後發表的理由論相關著作) 期末報告：60%</p>
課程核心 能力 (可複選)	<p>■ 1. 具備哲學論述之能力。 ■ 2. 具備哲學專著與期刊論文閱讀之能力。 ■ 3. 具備獨力研究之能力。</p>
備註	<p>一、<u>選修課程</u>請勾選隸屬領域：<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>形上學 <input type="checkbox"/>知識論 <input type="checkbox"/>倫理學與法政哲學 <input type="checkbox"/>心靈與語言哲學 <input type="checkbox"/>科學史與科學哲學 <input type="checkbox"/>數理邏輯與哲學邏輯 二、碩博合開課程請於授課大綱中註明碩士班及博士班成績評量方式，謝謝您。</p>

#### 附錄：課程閱讀文獻

#### 指定閱讀文獻

1. Logins, Arturs (2022), *Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
2. Williams, Bernard (1979), "Internal and External Reasons," in Ross Harrison (ed.), *Rational Action*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 101-113.
3. Millgram, Elijah (1996), "Williams' Argument Against External Reasons," *Nous*, 30(2), 197-220 (24 pages).
4. Korsgaard, Christine (1986), "Skepticism about Practical Reason," *The Journal of Philosophy*, 83 (1), 5-25.
5. Schroeder, M. (2008), "Having Reasons," *Philosophical Studies*, 139, 57-71.
6. Broome, John (2004), "Reasons," in R. Jay Wallace (ed.), *Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz*. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-28.
7. Brunero, John (2013), "Reasons as explanations," *Philosophical Studies*, 165, 805 - 824.
8. Way, Jonathan (2017), "Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 98 (2), 251-270.
9. McHugh, Conor & Way, Jonathan (2018), "What is Good Reasoning?," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 96(1), 153-174.
10. Hawthorne, John & Stanley, Jason (2008), "Knowledge and Action," *Journal of Philosophy*, 105, 571-590.

11. Neta, Ram (2009), "Treating Something as a Reason for Action," *Nous* 43, 684-699.
12. 王一奇 (2015), <理由與提供理由的事實>, 刊登於謝世民主編, 《理由轉向: 規範性的哲學研究》, 台大出版社, 頁次 105-140。
13. Wang, P.-S. & **Wang, L.** (2015), "Rules as Reason-Giving Facts: A Difference-Making-Based Account of the Normativity of Rules," in Araszkiewicz, M., Banas, P., Gizbert-Studnicki, T., Płeszka, K., (eds.), *Problems of Normativity, Rules and Rule-Following*, Springer, pp. 199-213.

## 參考閱讀文獻

### 規範理由

1. Internal vs. External Reasons
  1. Williams, Bernard (1979), "Internal and External Reasons," in Ross Harrison (ed.), *Rational Action*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 101-113.
  2. Millgram, Elijah (1996), "Williams' Argument Against External Reasons," *Nous*, 30(2), 197-220 (24 pages).
  3. Korsgaard, Christine (1986), "Skepticism about Practical Reason," *The Journal of Philosophy*, 83 (1), 5-25.
  4. Brunero, John (2017), "Recent Work on Internal and External Reasons," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 54 (2):99-118.
  5. Smith, Michael (1987), "The Humean Theory of Motivation," *Mind* 96 (381), 36-61.
  6. Schroeder, M. (2008), "Having Reasons," *Philosophical Studies*, 139, 57-71.
  7. Logins, Subjective Unpossessed Reasons
  8. Lin, Future Desires, the Agony Argument, and Subjectivism about Reasons
2. Reasons as Explanations
  - (1) Broome, John (2004), "Reasons," in R. Jay Wallace (ed.), *Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz*. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-28.
  - (2) Brunero, John (2013), "Reasons as explanations," *Philosophical Studies*, 165, 805 - 824.
  - (3) Wodak, Daniel (2020), "Redundant Reasons," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 98(2), 266-278.
  - (4) Finlay, S. (2020), "A "Good" Explanation of Five Puzzles about Reasons,"
3. Reasons as Premises
  - (1) Way, Jonathan (2017), "Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 98 (2), 251-270.
  - (2) McHugh, Conor & Way, Jonathan (2018), "What is Good Reasoning?," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 96(1), 153-174.
  - (3) Snedegar, Justin (2019), "Deliberation, Reasons, and Alternatives," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 100 (1), 1-22.

*Quarterly* 100 (3), 682-702.

(4) Schmidt, Eva (forthcoming), "Where reasons and reasoning come apart," *Nous*.

(5) Logins, Normative Reasons without (Good) Reasoning

(6) Way, Two Arguments for Evidentialism

#### 4. Reasons as others

(1) Gregory, Alex (2016), "Normative reasons as good bases," *Philosophical Studies*, 173, 2291-2310.

(2) Whiting, Daniel (2018), "Right in some respects: reasons as evidence," *Philosophical Studies*, 175, 2191-2208.

(3) Howard, Primary Reasons as Normative Reasons-Published

#### 5. 規範的應該

(1) Schroeder, M. (2011), "Ought, Agents, and Actions," *Philosophical Review*, 120 (1), 1-41.

(2) Chrisman, Matthew (2012), "'Ought' and Control," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 90 (3), 433-451.

(3) Finlay, S. & Snedegar, J. (2012), "One Ought Too Many," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 89(1), 102-124.

(4) Fogal, Reasons, reason, and context

(5) Henning, Normative Reasons Contextualism

(6) Snedegar, Contrastive Reasons and Promotion

#### 6. 理由與決策

(1) Hawthorne, John & Stanley, Jason (2008), "Knowledge and Action," *Journal of Philosophy*, 105, 571-590.

(2) Neta, Ram (2009), "Treating Something as a Reason for Action," *Nous* 43, 684-699.

(3) Kolodny, Niko & MacFarlane, John (2010), "Ifs and Oughts," *Journal of Philosophy* 107 (3), 115-143.

#### 7. 理由與理性

(1) Parfit, D. (2001), "Rationality and Reasons," in D. Egonsson, J. Josefsson, B. Petterson & T. Ronnow-Rasmussen (Eds.), *Exploring practical philosophy: from action to values*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 17-39.

(2) Bratman, M. (1981), "Intention and Means-End Reasoning," *The Philosophical Review*, 90, 252-265.

(3) Broome, John (1999), "Normative requirements," *Ratio* 12 (4):398-419.

(4) Kolodny, Niko (2005), "Why be rational," *Mind* 114 (455):509-563.

(5) Broome, John (2007), "Wide or narrow scope?," *Mind* 116 (462), 359-370.

(6) Fogal, Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure

## 8. 依理由行動

- (1) Davidson, Donald (1963), “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” *Journal of Philosophy* 60 (23), 685-700.
- (2) Frankfurt, Harry G. (1978), “The Problem of Action,” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 15 (2), 157-162.
- (3) Parfit, Derek (1997), “Reasons and Motivation,” *Aristotelian Society Supplementary*, 71 (1), 99–130.
- (4) Broome, John (1997), “Reasons and Motivation,” *Aristotelian Society Supplementary*, 71 (1), 131–146.
- (5) Wallace, R. Jay (1999), “Three Conceptions of Rational Agency,” *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 2 (3), 217-242.
- (6) Dancy, Jonathan (2004), “Two Ways of Explaining Actions,” *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* 55, 25-42.
- (7) Brewer, Bill (1995), “Mental Causation: Compulsion by Reason,” *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 69, 237-253.
- (8) Korsgaard, Christine M. (2005), “Acting for a Reason,” *Danish Yearbook of Philosophy*, 40 (1):11-35.
- (9) Alvarez, Maria (2018), “Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality,” *Synthese* 195, 3293–3310.
- (10) Sinclair, On the Connection between Normative Reasons and the Possibility of Acting for Those Reasons

## 9. Deviant Causal Chain

- (1) Schlosser, Markus (2007), “Basic Deviance Reconsidered,” *Analysis*, 67 (3), 186-194.
- (2) Tännsjö, Torbjörn (2009), “On deviant causal chains – no need for a general criterion,” *Analysis*, Volume 69, Issue 3, July 2009, Pages 469–473.
- (3) Schlosser, Markus (2010), “Bending it like beckham: Movement, control and deviant causal chains,” *Analysis* 70 (2):299-303 (2010)
- (4) Wu, W. (2016), “Experts and Deviants: The Story of Agentive Control,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 92(2), 101-126.